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Calls for a transition to a low-carbon energy system, favouring renewable energy sources, energy 
efficiency and conservation are now entering the mainstream of policy discourse in many sectors and parts 
of the world, with some measurable effects. This paper explores the transformative nature of these calls on 
key aspects of the global political economy. It argues that a diverse and increasingly effective discourse 
coalition is emerging around the concept of energy transition, and looks at how the Transition Movement 
wishes to reconfigure the nature, the content and the governance of the global political economy. More 
specifically, it asks how this movement sees the world, what makes up its ontological worldview, and how 
it wants to change it. This paper further suggests that these calls are accompanied by remarkable changes 
in global investment patterns in favour of key elements of what can be labelled “the green economy”. 
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Two contemporary concerns, climate change and energy security, are now profoundly changing 
the way some policy-makers, academics, business and civil society representatives perceive the 
evolution of the global political economy. Many now share the view that the world’s energy 
system, based on fossil fuels supplying more than 80% of primary energy demand (IEA, 2011), is 
environmentally and economically unsustainable and has to be changed. 
 
Calls for a transition to a low-carbon energy system, favouring renewable energy sources, energy 
efficiency and conservation are now entering the mainstream of policy discourse in many sectors 
and parts of the world, with some measurable effects.  According to some, concerns around 
climate change impacts and energy security are now “unleashing a wave of policy initiatives and 
investments around the world that will fundamentally alter the way we manage and use energy”, 
one of the pillars of today’s globalized economy (Lloyd’s, 2010). These transformations may be 
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the prelude to a “new industrial revolution,” one that could change global industrial structures 
and shape international and domestic economic policy (Lee, 2009: 1104). Until very recently, the 
discipline of International Political Economy (IPE) has not paid a great deal of attention to these 
calls for change. Given the depth and scope of the transformations called for, increased academic 
investigation of these issues may be in order. Doing so would be answering the call of Robert 
Keohane (2009), one of the most distinguished IPE scholars, to renew the field by paying 
attention to a broader range of issues, including energy issues, and looking beyond states to 
consider the growing role of civil society in the affairs of the world. Keohane also suggests the  
use of a plurality of investigative techniques, including an examination of how “ideas people 
have in their heads, and that they share collectively, affect their preferences.” Keohane’s 
suggestion, in effect, incites rigorous analysis from a constructivist perspective. 
 
This paper explores the transformative nature of the calls for a fundamental energy transition in 
many aspects of the global political economy. It argues that a diverse and increasingly effective 
discourse coalition is emerging around the concept of energy transition. I refer to this discourse 
coalition as the Transition Movement. Actors making up this loose (and often self unaware) 
coalition share a critical and transformative global perspective, one that calls for massive 
investment flows to new or completely restructured industries. Their shared perspective also calls 
for increasing the pace of technology innovation and for the return of states to orchestrate this 
transition. This paper looks at how the Transition Movement wishes to reconfigure the nature, the 
content and the governance of the global political economy. More specifically, the paper asks 
how this movement sees the world and how it wants to change it. 
 
This paper further suggests that while the transition perspective has yet to impose itself in the 
form of a robust and constraining international energy and/or climate regime, its slow integration 
into mainstream political discourse has nonetheless been accompanied by remarkable changes in 
global investment patterns in favour of key elements of what can be labelled the “green 
economy”. According to UNEP (2011), this transition to a green economy3 is indeed already 
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The following section (Section I) introduces the concepts of discourse coalition and describes 
how such a coalition creates narratives and storylines – embedded inside a frame - in order to 
gain control over a public policy domain. I will also discuss the process of naming and framing as 
inherent to the creation of these storylines. Section II analyses the contours of the Transition 
Movement’s frame (i.e., the transition frame), focusing on its ontology and prescriptions, and 
presents its main storyline. Section III discusses how this frame influences the nature, content and 
governance of the global political economy. Section IV provides some quantitative evidence that 
some of these changes are already underway, most notably in the phenomenal growth of 
investments in renewable energy, a key component of the growing green economy. 
 
I – The narrative construction of the world 
 
For some, public policy formulation can be best seen as the struggle for control over how one 
should think about a specific policy problem. According to Hajer (1993: 47), politics is a 
“process in which different actors from various backgrounds form specific coalitions around 
specific story lines. Story lines are the medium through which actors try to impose their views of 
reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social 
arrangements.” Hajer states that, “[a] discourse coalition is basically a group of actors who share 
a social construct. Social constructs (…) can be seen as a way to give meaning to ambiguous 
social circumstances.”  (Hajer, 1993: 45). 
 
Discourse coalitions are not necessarily organized politically or socially (through such 
institutions as a political party, a church or an academic discipline), nor are they necessarily 
highly aware of their own existence. Some are structured (e.g., the Catholic church is organized, 
structured, and self-aware) and others, less so.  Free-traders from around the world share a 
common worldview, but do not, for the most of them, belong to the World Economic Forum. 
Similarly, indignés (and Occupy sympathizers) do not all belong to ATTAC. Nevertheless, all 
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discourse coalitions seem to share some form of idealized social construction. Such social 
constructions, as shared by discourse coalitions, are best described and explained through the 
concept of frame (or frame of reference), as defined by Rein and Schön (1993: 146). According 
to these authors, framing  
 
“(…) is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to 
provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from 
which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on.” 
 
This concept of frame traces its roots to research in sociology and cognitive psychology and 
refers – at the individual level, to the “mental structures that allow human beings to understand 
reality, and sometimes create what we take to be reality. [T]hey structure our ideas and concepts, 
they shape how we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and how we act” (Lakoff, 
2006: 25). 
 
From a collective perspective, the worldview embedded within frames is distilled by social actors 
through derived narratives or storylines using various forms of language and delivery methods 
(political speeches, policy documents, advertisement, blog posts and editorials, social media, 
etc.). According to Fletcher (2009: 801), the purpose of frame analysis is then to focus on “how 
social actors use language (…) to mobilize key stakeholders, attempt to build a broad public 
consensus around a course of action, and focus sustained media attention on a specific issue”. 
Storytelling is inherent to the promotion of frames. Each storyline constructs a way that helps 
apprehend a given problematic situation by first describing what the problem is and then by 
suggesting what is to be done about it. This process of naming and framing thus generates both a 
worldview, or ontology, and a call for action or a prescriptive agenda. For Schön and Rein (1994: 
26), this process: 
 
 “select[s] for attention a few salient features and relations from what would otherwise be an 
overwhelmingly complex reality. [It] give[s] these elements a coherent organization, and (…) 
describe[s] what is wrong with the present situation in such a way as to set the direction for its 
future transformation. Through the process of naming and framing, the stories make the ‘normative 
leap’ from data to recommendations, from fact to values, from “ is ” to “ ought”. 
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Using recent policy documents originating from diverse sources (international organizations, 
governments, businesses, universities, think tanks and NGOs), the next section analyses the 
growing discourse calling for a transition away from fossil fuels and towards a new energy 
system based on renewable energy, energy efficiency and conservation. It shows how an 
emerging discourse coalition, the Transition Movement, frames energy-related issues as 
problematic and suggests ways to address them.  
 
II - Naming and framing the energy [r]evolution 
 
Calls for an energy transition away from fossil fuels – especially oil - are not exactly a 
contemporary novelty. One can justifiably argue that such calls were last heard during the first 
and second oil shocks of the 1970s, characterized by supply disruptions, fears around the levels 
of remaining oil reserves and skyrocketing prices (Lovins, 1976; Yergin, 1991). Better to reduce 
one’s country’s dependence on foreign oil through increased domestic production and reduced 
consumption, some said, than to remain at the mercy of political and economic conditions set by 
unfriendly regimes. This argument continues to be heard today – sometimes with renewed force, 
as energy markets and geopolitical conditions evolve (Deutch and Schlesinger. 2006; Klare, 
2008; Paskal, 2010). 
 
What makes today’s calls to shed dependence on fossil fuels distinct from the discourse of the 
1970s is the growing global concern over climate change, which has attained a prominent status 
as an issue worthy of international attention. Today, “[w]e cannot talk about energy security 
without also referring to environmental security, more specifically the potentially dangerous 
effects of global warming and climate change” (Dalgaard and Glöck, 2010:  15). 
 
Over the last two decades, a growing scientific consensus has emerged on the question of climate 
change and its causes (IPCC, 2007). Because of the close links between the global energy system 
and emissions of greenhouse gases, it has become obvious to many that the energy system that 
has been taken for granted carries a very heavy environmental burden. Fossil fuels – coal, oil and 
natural gas – are the backbone of the energy system that supports the global economy, delivering 
more than 80% of global primary energy demand (IEA, 2011). At the same time, carbon 
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emissions from extraction, transport and combustion of fossil fuels are responsible for more than 
60% of total global GHG emissions. In essence, says the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2007: 28), “mitigating climate change cannot, therefore, be successful without a radical change 
in the way we produce, transform and use energy.” This analysis is at the very core of the 
Transition Movement worldview. 
 
Many people now believe that the world energy system must now supply the needs of people and 
economies while simultaneously providing environmental security and helping avoid the 
consequences of dangerous climate change. The current fossil-based energy system cannot 
deliver both of these needs. In fact, the continuation of the current system, on a business-as-usual 
basis, will likely deliver energy supply at the expense of environmental security. Therefore, a 
radical change of the world’s relation to energy, an “energy [r]evolution” (EREC and 
Greenpeace, 2010: 8-9 ; Baumert, 2005: 18 ; Huq, 2011: 61) now appears necessary in order to 
successfully counter climate change, seen as the most significant environmental threat of this 
century. A new energy system must therefore emerge to replace the current on based on fossil 
fuels (Lee, 2009: 1114).  
 
The world of energy, named and framed by the Transition Movement 
 
One can identify at least six fundamental precepts at the core of the Transition Movement’s 
worldview on energy. This worldview constitutes the frame of reference of this discourse 
coalition. As with all processes of naming and framing, a storyline is derived from this frame of 
reference. This storyline contains both a description of a problematic situation – in this case, the 
nexus of energy and climate change -  as well as solutions to address it. Based on the review of 
dozens of recent documents, public speeches and reports from diverse sources (businesses, 
NGOs, think tanks, academics, government and international agencies), I would argue that the 
core precepts of the transition frame of reference are: (1) climate change as an fundamental threat  
to human existence that can only be resolved through a clean energy transition; (2) climate, 
energy and economy as interconnected issues that can be solved with integrated solutions; (3) 
renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and conservation as drivers of the transition; (4) a 
low-carbon future as economically, socially and environmentally beneficial for all; (5) control 
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and deployment of low-carbon technologies as competitive advantages in the race for pole 
position in the 21st century economy; and (6) the state as leader and manager of the clean energy 
transition. 
 
I will succinctly review each of these precepts and then try to synthesize the main storyline of the 
Transition Movement. 
 
First, addressing climate change through a clean energy transition is of an existential nature for 
the well-being of Humanity (Pode, 2010). A “compromise” or balance on environmental and 
climate security cannot be reached by trading some levels of emissions for some levels of 
economic growth and access to energy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
publishes regular assessment reports on the existence, causes and impacts of global climate 
change, as well as solutions to this global threat. These reports provide the scientific and 
intellectual foundation of the Transition discourse coalition. Transition Movement proponents 
thus present the rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as an absolute necessity from a 
public policy point of view. They also advocate actions on the part of businesses, cities and local 
communities as well as families and individuals (Séguin and Duchaine, 2009; EREC and 
Greenpeace, 2010). 
 
From the perspective of the proponents of the Transition Movement, it follows that the only 
responsible course of action is to move away from fossil fuels as quickly as possible: 
 
“ It is no exaggeration to claim that the future of human prosperity depends on how successfully  
we tackle two central energy challenges facing us today: securing supply of reliable and 
affordable energy; and effecting a rapid transformation to a low-carbon, efficient and envi- 
ronmentally benign system of energy supply. “ (AIE, 2007: 37) 
 
This call to action is continually reinforced by frequent and alarming scientific findings that point 
to increased impacts of climate change on ecosystems and communities around the world.  
 
Second, the Transition worldview adopts an integrated perspective of energy, economic and 
environmental issues. In contrast to seeking a compromise by balancing three distinct policy 
areas, Transition Movement proponents call for the adoption of policies that aim at their very 
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intersection (Pode, 2010: 3015). The transition away from fossil fuels and towards renewables, 
energy efficiency and conservation leads to a “trifecta” of increased energy security (through 
increased reliance on domestic, and increasingly decentralized energy sources), economic 
development and job creation (through the surge of new green and clean energy jobs), and 
climate protection. In this regard, there is no “inescapable trade-off between environmental 
sustainability and economic progress” (UNEP, 2011: 2). 
 
Third, the transformation of the global energy system can be made possible through the rapid 
deployment of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, geothermal and biomass, as well as 
increased efficiency in the use of energy and energy conservation. Transition proponents call for 
a fundamental transformation of the ways energy is produced, transformed, distributed and used 
all along industrial value and supply-chains. To do so, they express a clear preference for low-
emission energy sources and enhanced demand management, as well as for locally produced and 
distributed energy sources (Sweden, 2006; Nye et al., 2010; EREC and Greenpeace, 2010; 
ITPOES, 2010). Technological innovation and dissemination are also seen as key to the 
acceleration of the transition, as well as some of its main enablers (Foxon, Reed and Stringer, 
2009). 
 
Fourth, the Transition perspective professes a resolutely optimistic view of a low-carbon future 
(Rubin, 2009 ; and even, earlier on, Lovins, 1976), one that could “create opportunities for all 
countries” (Huq, 2011: 63) It considers the transformation of the global energy system as 
inherently economically beneficial, most notably through diminished dependence on imported 
fossil fuels, especially oil, whose cost is deemed to b ever-increasing (Lloyd’s, 2010: 5). 
Moreover, a switch to renewable energy sources and more efficient or even less energy 
consumption is perceived as capable of generating more jobs (i.e., “green jobs”) than the current 
fossil-based energy system. This “revolution” also presents “huge opportunities for new business 
partnerships” (Lloyd’s, 2010 : 5). The transition is also seen as generating diverse “cobenefits” – 
improved health and air quality, for example, as well as overall increase in quality of life (EREC 
and Greenpeace, 2010 ; Mousseau, 2008: 144). For UNEP (2011: 3): 
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“ […] the greening of economies is not generally a drag on growth but rather a new engine of 
growth; (…) it is a net generator of decent jobs, and (…) it is also a vital strategy for the 
elimination of persistent poverty. “  
 
Fifth, the control and adoption of green, low-carbon technologies, along with more energy 
efficient economies and firms, are deemed to create competitive advantages against rival nations 
and businesses (EREC and Greenpeace, 2010; ITPOES, 2010). Companies that plan ahead and 
take advantage of these changes will “increase both their resilience and their competitiveness. 
Failure to do so could lead to expensive and potentially catastrophic consequences” (Lloyd’s, 
2010: 4). Many political speeches now adopt the notion that the world has embarked in a “race to 
the 21st century economy,” where no one wishes to be left behind: 
 
“We can’t stand by as we let China race ahead to create the clean energy jobs and industries of the 
future (…) We should be developing those renewable energy sources, and creating those high-
wage, high-skill jobs right here in the United States of America.” 
 
 – President Barack Obama, quoted in the Florida Independent, October 13 2010 
 
Finally, one of the most interesting and potentially controversial precepts of the Transition 
Movement’s worldview is the call for a return of states – in all shapes and forms, and at all levels 
of governance – to orchestrate this transition to a low-carbon energy system. 
 
For some, the main problem can be boiled down as a matter of “gross misallocation of capital”, 
a situation that has allowed firms to run up largely significant and largely unchecked social and 
environmental externalities (UNEP, 2011: 1-2). In a noted and extensive study on the economics 
of climate change sponsored by the British government, Lord Stern defines climate change as the 
greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen (Stern, 2006: i). If markets cannot mitigate 
climate change on their own, state is seen as the only power capable of stepping in and imposing 
proper corrective measures. The Transition Movement thus gives the state two essential roles:  
one of leader, showing the direction of change on behalf of society and collective good; and one 
of manager of the transition, setting targets and goals for businesses, society and itself, and using 
a whole array of public policy tools - regulation and law, procurement, investment, subsidies and 
fiscal policy. More specifically, the state is called upon to encourage reduction of energy 
consumption (Rubin, 2010: 23-24), to invest (or to encourage investments) in renewable energy 
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sources (Pode, 2010; EREC and Greenpeace, 2010; Lloyd’s, 2010; UNEP, 2011) and to reach 
international agreements on future climate and energy regimes (Muller-Kraenner, 2008). 
 
Indeed, from the perspective of the Transition Movement, without the return of the state in the 
driver’s seat, transition to a low-carbon energy system appears impossible. 
 
Once upon a time… – the Transition storyline 
 
One can now derive from the frame of reference of the Transition Movement the following 
storyline: 
 
Climate change is a threat to ecosystems and societies around the world. Mitigating 
emissions that cause climate change is a moral imperative. 
 
The modern energy system based on fossil fuels is the main source of greenhouse gas 
emissions. In order to avoid dangerous climate change, the world has to rapidly switch to 
another low-carbon energy system. 
 
We need to change the way we produce, transform, distribute and use energy. What is 
needed is rapid deployment of renewable energy sources, increased energy efficiency and 
energy conservation. We need to use less energy overall, and obtain the energy we do use 
from low-carbon sources. 
 
Left to their own devices, markets alone will not deliver on what is needed. In order to 
avoid dangerous climate change, states are needed to play a lead role in the transition to a 
green economy. 
 
This transition will be economically and environmentally beneficial. Green jobs will be 
created and quality of life for all will improve. The switch to clean energy is beneficial to 
the economy, to energy security and to the environment. 
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If we don’t engage in this transition quickly and seriously enough, other countries and 




III- Wishing for a new world – how the global political economy should change 
 
This paper has argued that a discourse coalition – the Transition Movement – has emerged in the 
past fifteen years, alarmed by the growing scientific consensus surrounding the threat posed by 
anthropogenic climate change. Section II highlights the contours of its worldview and normative 
prescriptions. I have suggested a general perspective of how this Movement sees the problem and 
what it believes should be done about it. The question now, is how does such a worldview sees 
the transformation of the main structures of the global political economy, based on open markets, 
limited role of the state, integrated and globalized production and supply and value-chains? 
 
Lee (2009) provides a valid start for this investigation. First, by highlighting the transformative 
nature of a global transition to low-carbon energy system: “[a]s states, firms and markets jostle 
for position in the move towards a global low-carbon economy, a new global political and 
economic order may be in the making” (Lee, 2009: 1114). For her, the political economy of the 
energy transition leads to a fundamental restructuring of economies, industries and political 
relations:  
 
“These imminent changes will shape the social and political structure and dynamics in the years to 
come. They will play an increasing role in determining the global industrial structure, new 
producer–consumer relations, and ultimately the distribution of the benefits and the future of 
globalization.” (Lee, 2009: 1104) 
 
Transitioning to a low-carbon energy system creates winners and losers across and within 
industries and nations. Some actors have much to gain from this switch – or think they do; some 
do not - or think they do not. This analysis of the Transition Movement’s frame of reference and 
storyline leads me to believe that three main changes to the current global political economy are 
called for: (1) a change in both domestic and global economies and industrial structures; (2) the 
return of the state to the driver’s seat; and (3) a rearranging of political and economic power 
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resulting from a clash between two types of economic structures, one fossil-fuel-based, the other 
low-carbon-based.  
 
Transforming domestic and global economies and industrial structures 
 
First, the Transition Movement prescribes the reconfiguration of domestic and international 
economic structures around what could be called “the green economy”. This reconfiguration is 
structured around two main vehicles: (1) a massive modification of the direction of national and 
global investment flows to the benefits of specific industries and sectors (and to the detriment of 
others); (2) a switch to decentralized and localized low-carbon energy production, reduction of 
firms’ carbon footprints, and transformation of firms’ supply and value-chains. 
 




To transform the global energy system based on fossil fuels, the Transition Movement favours 
the reallocation of colossal investment flows towards low-carbon energy production and 
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technologies to minimize energy use. Solar, wind, geothermal and biomass are now key energy 
subsectors prioritized by the Transition Movement, as well as mass public transit systems, green 
urban development and low-carbon fuels. Recent UNEP studies thus make the case for investing 
two per cent of annual global GDP (i.e., one-tenth of total annual global investments) in greening 
ten key sectors of the economy in order to shift development and unleash public and private 
capital flows onto a low-carbon, resource-efficient path (UNEP, 2011). Most notably, 
development of these economic segments mainly focuses on substitution for fossil-based energy 
production and conventional car-based transportation.  
 
Generally, it can be argued that a large portion (if not most) of these investments in green 
technologies and related subsectors will cannibalize investments that would otherwise be made  
in sectors linked to fossil-fuel industries. For example, due to a limited resource pool, public 
investments in mass public transit could substitute for investments in new highways. Regulations 
that constrain the operations of coal-fired electricity plants could induce firms to develop new 
capacity by investing in state-of-the-art gas-fired power plants, wind farms and/or 
hydroelectricity.  Moreover, as “enabling conditions are heavily weighted towards, and 
encourage, the prevailing brown economy, which (…) depends excessively on fossil fuel energy” 
(UNEP, 2011: 2), the Transition Movement’s prescriptions call for the elimination of public 
financial support to fossil-fuel industries. Movement proponents also suggest that some level of 
public support in favour of green alternatives should help level the playing field between the 
“green” and “brown” economies. The 2009 G8 Pittsburgh Declaration specifically calls for such 
fiscal rearrangements: 
 
“ [t]o phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while 
providing targeted support for the poorest. Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies encourage wasteful 
consumption, reduce our energy security, impede investment in clean energy sources and 





Secondly, the Transition Movement also calls for fundamental modifications to national and 
global industrial structures. This aspect of the transition away from fossil fuels still appears 
under-documented. The very nature of low-carbon energy technologies seems to lead to some 
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form of localization and decentralization of energy production near residential, institutional and 
industrial consumers. In fact, some consumers are actively seeking (actively being encouraged) to 
become energy producers themselves in order to increase their energy savings and self-
sufficiency. This is reinforced by the idea that the “transition to a green economy will vary 
considerably between nations, as it depends on the specifics of each country’s natural and human 
capital and on its relative level of development” (UNEP, 2011: 4 ; Lloyd’s, 2010: 5).  
 
Driven by recent and transformative technological advances and breakthroughs, especially in 
relations to the improved economics of wind and solar PV energy, new business opportunities 
could arise and economic hubs (cities, states, nations) could be created (Clean Tech Group and 
WWF, 2012). One of the most obvious potential impacts of these transformations could be the 
breaking-down of the oligopolistic or near-oligopolistic structure of industrial energy production, 
still largely based on large-scale production units in many parts of the world despite decades of 
deregulation. Similarly, increased “mutualisation” of transportation modes through mass public 
transit, as well as the potential for their widespread electrification, could be seen as a direct threat 
to the oil industry which has enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly over the transportation sector 
since the end of the World War II. 
 
In order to achieve substantial reductions in both consumers and firms’ carbon-footprints, the 
Transition Movement is also trying to influence the nature of firms’ supply and value-chains. As 
governments are asked to stop supporting fossil-fuel sectors and to start levelling the playing 
field for low-carbon alternatives through subsidies, incentives, favourable fiscal policy, 
regulation, and the implementation of carbon markets, new constraints and opportunities emerge 
for firms.  Businesses must now address “the impacts of energy and carbon constraints 
holistically, and throughout their supply-chain,” paying attention to the “tight profit margins” on 
some products that rely on long-distance transportation, as oil prices go up and local suppliers 
become more competitive. Retail industries might even have to “re-evaluate the ‘just-in-time 
business model” (Lloyd’s, 2010: 5). 
 
The Transition Movement prescribes that firms become more energy efficient and/or to use low-
carbon forms of energy. These new constraints and opportunities create other interesting areas of 
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change. First, they transform the nature of relations between firms and their internal or external 
suppliers, the latter being asked to “green” their production and reduce their carbon footprint. 
Second, they favour the adoption of technology innovation, potentially hastening technology 
turnover in many industrial sectors, especially for large emitters such as energy producers and 
heavy industries (mining, aluminium and steel, pulp and paper, etc.). Finally, calls for carbon 
footprint reduction challenge long supply chains and the transport of goods over long distances.  
 
The state: back in the driver’s seat 
 
The second main challenge in the global political economy suggested by the Transition 
Movement is a more prominent role for the state, without which the energy transition will not 
materialize. To assume this leadership role, states have their work cut out for them, especially in 
the industrialized world:  
 
“That means [rich nations] adopting ambitious emissions reduction targets; encouraging effective 
market mechanisms; supporting programmes to combat deforestation; promoting rapid 
technological progress to mitigate the effects of climate change; and honouring their aid 
commitments to the developing world.” 




States are asked to change their fiscal policies, reform and reduce environmentally harmful 
subsidies, introduce new market-based instruments, target investments to key green sectors, 
introduce green public procurement policies, and improve and implement environmental 
regulations more effectively (UNEP, 2011: 2).  These are Herculean tasks considering the trends 
in the relations between states and businesses in the last decades. 
 
With respect to the contemporary globalization of investments, finance, production and trade, the 
state has made way to a much more autonomous private sector. The Transition Movement is now 
calling for a substantial re-empowerment of the state. This is consistent with the view that the 
market is inherently a social and political battleground between private economic interests 
seeking increased autonomy and manoeuvring room and governments whose role is to seek what 
it sees as the common good through institutions of regulation.  
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“ (…) the market is a social institution and, therefore, a political issue where the goal is not only to 
determine the frontier between what is public and what is private, but also the level of autonomy 
of the markets vis-à-vis other social institutions.”  (Deblock, 2000: 5) 
 
The Transition Movement thus challenges today’s frontiers between the market and the state, the 
results of decades of deregulation and globalization. It wants the state to channel resources, to 
regulate businesses, to invest in innovation and low-carbon infrastructure, to encourage the 
adoption of green technologies and to influence consumer choices, using a wide range of policy 
instruments. 
 
Also, the Transition Movement more or less subtly prods the state towards “new forms of 
mercantilism” (Rioux, 2010: 26) by emphasizing what it perceives as a global race to the green, 
low-carbon economy. In this race, one of the goals of the state is to gain or maintain competitive 
advantage over rivals by fostering low-carbon innovations and by controlling and implementing 
low-carbon technologies across the national economy. 
 
These calls for a central role for the state may shake the backbone of today’s globalization based 
on the autonomy and predominance of market forces over public controls. New equilibrium 
might possibly result (Lee, 2010: 1112). 
 
What is brown is not green 
 
The third change potentially brought by the Transition Movement concerns the rearrangement of 
political and economic power resulting from a clash between two types of economic structures, 
one fossil-fuel-based, the other low-carbon-based. It can certainly be argued that the Transition 
Movement’s worldview is highly disruptive for large segments of the global political economy, 
namely the industrial structures of the fossil-fuel economy and their supportive political 
arrangements. As this economy is the root cause of global climate change, the end of its 
domination is of the essence according to the Transition Movement’s worldview and 
prescriptions. In short, transitioning to a low-carbon energy system through a new “energy and 
industrial revolution” will inevitably create winners and losers: 
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“The problem is that effective action on climate change (…) poses a deep challenge to the existing 
power structures— whether at the national or international level. […] To steer the world firmly 
onto a low-carbon development trajectory amounts to creating conditions for a new industrial 
revolution. The process is also likely to create new haves and have-nots.“ (Lee, 2009: 1110) 
 
The question of who loses what and who gains what, aims at the very core of the investigative 
field of IPE. Potential losers from a transition to a low-carbon energy system will likely deploy 
delaying tactics or oppose it outright and/or to seek protection from favourable political 
coalitions. Alternatively, economic interests who stand to gain from the transition should actively 
push for it and seek support from favourable political coalitions. 
 
 
IV - Fulfilling the prophecy: is the global political economy becoming green? 
 
The Transition Movement certainly seems to know what it wants. Its overarching goal is clearly 
defined and its solutions toolbox well-stocked. Arguably, its storyline seems to be compelling 
enough to convince major actors, including economic ones, to adopt and disseminate its 
worldview. 
 
For some, indeed, the transition to a low-carbon energy system is already underway (Lloyd’s, 
2010; UNEP, 2010). Can one find empirical evidence of this? Based on some limited evidence, 
there seems to be movement in this direction, especially in terms of change in investment flows. 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance has tracked global trends in renewable energy investments since 
2004. Its key 2009 findings clearly indicate that movements are occurring in energy investments, 
where a clear momentum now seems to exist in favour of renewables, despite current economic 
hardship in many parts of the world. These findings are corroborated by other studies as well, 
such as WWF’s Clean Economy, Living Planet 2011 Report (WWF, 2011). Moreover, some 
evidence also suggests a steady restructuring of parts of the energy system towards decentralized 
and localized renewable energy production. Lastly, recent data seem to indicate that investments 
in low-carbon energy has, for the first time, surpassed those made in traditional, fossil-based 
energy. Again according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, investments in clean energy, 
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especially wind, solar, waves and biomass, drew $187 Billion in 2010, compared with $157 
Billion for coal, oil and natural gas4. 
 
First, global investments in renewable energy have been growing steadily for the past decade, 
increasing 32% over 2009 to a record $211 billion in 2010 (an annualized increase of 36% since 
2004). This seems to be partly the result of the “green elements” of most countries’ economic 
stimulus package materializing (HSBC, 2009). The lion’s share of these record investments 
levels went to large-scale wind-farm development in China and small-scale solar PV on rooftops 
in Europe (mainly Germany). The level of investment in these small-scale energy production 
projects also reached a record of $60 billion in 2010 – up 91% over 2009. Moreover, government 
funded research and development also jumped 121%, reaching another record of $5.3 billion in 
2010. At the same time, corporate research, development and deployment fell 12% from 2009 to 
2010, and were recorded at $3.3 billion, as companies reduced investments during the crisis. 
 
Second, the developing countries ($72 billion) have, for the first time in 2010, overtook 
developed ones ($70 billion) in new financial investments in renewables. Not surprisingly, China 
led the way, with $48.9 billion of financial new investments, while other emerging economies 
also showing strong growth in investments. 
 
Third, technological improvements and innovations have substantially reduced the price per 
megawatt of energy in many renewable energy sectors, with the most dramatic decreases in solar 
PV (with price plummeting by 60% between the summer of 2008 and 2010). This significant 
price decrease has made solar energy competitive with the retail price of conventional electricity 
in a number of sunny countries. With price of wind turbines also declining sharply, the 
competitive position of renewable energy seems increasingly positive: “[f]urther improvements 
in the levelized cost of energy for solar, wind and other technologies lie ahead, posing bigger and 
bigger threat to the dominance of fossil-fuel generation sources in the next few years.” This 
remarkable improvement in the fortune of renewable energy technologies seems to have 




remained relatively unnoticed, “taking place at a pace that public opinion and policy-makers 
were simply failing to spot.” (Bloomberg, 2011 : 12). 
 
Based on some of the evidence presented above, it appears that parts of the Transition 
Movement’s prescription are materializing. Renewable energy investments are indeed on the rise, 
having reached record levels despite a difficult economic downturn. Substantial investments now 
do go to decentralized and localized renewable energy sources. Moreover, some sources suggest 
that investments in renewables have overtaken investments in new fossil fuel production.  
 
The case has been made here that a new discourse coalition has emerged around the notion of 
energy transition. This coalition, made up of disparate organisations, individuals and 
governments, share a common worldview – a frame of reference – that it communicates through 
a coherent storyline which contains both a way of looking at the problem and ways to address it. 
This discourse coalition wants to see clear changes to the nature, content and governance of the 
global political economy. Without necessarily linking discourse with effects, some evidence 
suggest that some of these changes are slowly materializing, especially in terms of investment 
flows to renewable energy sources. Some evidence are also suggesting changes in the near-
oligopolistic nature of energy production, through increased decentralized and localized energy 
production. Whether or not these trends will continue remains to be seen and should be the 
subject of further academic investigation. 
 
This situation is obviously evolving rapidly. The Transition Movement may change form, split or 
gain new allies. Its worldview can also evolve. One should be particularly aware of the growing 
presence of the alterglobalization movement in the debate on climate change and energy. While 
also calling for a radical energy transition, alterglobalists are calling for a dismemberment of 
current states-markets relations in a far more radical way that is proposed by the Transition 
Movement. This could lead to a reframing of the issue, and to modified storylines. 
 
Lastly, one of the most fascinating aspects of the worldview espoused by the Transition 
Movement is its inherent hostility towards the fossil-fuel industry. How this industry reacts to the 
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calls for a rapid and profound transition to a new energy system – and the resulting clash – will 
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